They are likely to try to dismantle the military infrastructure that Syria has effectively rebuilt since More ambitiously, and also more risky, the United States might declare a longer-term policy of revisiting these targets to keep them out of use and have Syrian aircraft bottled up inside their Russian bases - in effect trying to operate a quasi "no-fly zone" in Syria, at least for a while.
Last year when the US struck President Assad's Shayrat airbase in retaliation for the use of chemical weapons in Khan Sheikhoun, the Syrian air force made sure it was seen to be back in action within a day.
The US will be determined that this does not happen again, which is why we can expect this to be a more prolonged air campaign with repeated attacks on key sites. It certainly won't make any immediate difference to the civil population of Syria, who have suffered so much at the hands of their own government, and the multitude of rebel, terrorist and guerrilla groups, some of whom have intimidated, as much as they have represented, them.
And President Assad is unlikely to relent in his determination to consolidate his hold on the country. So why take all the risks of escalation with Russia and the prospects of unintended consequences that normally follow? On its own, military force is meaningless. It has to be part of a political strategy and in this case the strategy is about bigger issues than Syria itself and only offers a long-shot hope for the Syrian population. The first objective is to push back against the increasing "normalisation" of chemical weapons being used in wars of any kind.
The taboo against them has been surprisingly strong since the end of World War One. The Chemical Weapons Convention of has been one of the most effective disarmament measures in modern history. Syria is a signatory to it. In President Obama claimed he would uphold that taboo as a "red line", but then didn't. And despite firm denials from the Assad government, there is an abundance of evidence that Syrian forces, with Russian connivance, have been using chemical weapons against their own people on a regular basis ever since.
Many Western politicians feel that - with all the moral grey areas of this situation - they cannot sell the pass on this issue yet again. It has become a test case for the international rule of law, which is under severe pressure on many fronts. Beyond that, some argue effective military action would represent an acceptance that Western powers have got to get back into the game of Middle East politics at a time when the region is melting down.
The campaign against so-called Islamic State IS was always a geopolitical sideshow, and Western influence on what has been happening from Lebanon to the Yemen has been in steep decline. It has characterized opposition fighters as untrained do-gooders and ruthless fanatics. Foreign fighters were barely present. Extremist ideologies were held by a small minority of opposition fighters—at most.
By mid, opposition gains had pushed the Assad regime into such a precarious position that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his military to intervene. It was only well into the uprising, and in response to the failure of the United States and its allies to respond to appeals for assistance, that the armed opposition underwent a process of radicalization. Even then, as late as January , moderate battalions affiliated with the Free Syrian Army defeated and pushed the Islamic State units out of positions they had seized across opposition-held areas of northern and eastern Syria, contradicting narratives about the unchecked extremism of the opposition.
Because it misread processes of radicalization, the White House missed low-risk opportunities to check the growth of extremist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State.
Instead, as numerous interviews with fighters make clear, radicalization was instrumental rather than ideological. The absence of support from the West created incentives for Syrian fighters to auction their support to the most extreme bidders, regardless of their worldviews.
Syrian fighters followed resources, not beliefs. Affiliation did not always signal loyalty. Compliance did not always imply commitment. In such cases, more robust U.
What about sectarianism? In the Syrian case , however, the evidence points in the opposite direction: polarization, extremism and fragmentation are the effects of escalating violence, not its causes. Recent survey data reflect the impact of sectarian polarization in Syria after years of conflict, but also the extent to which Syrians continue to express tolerance and a desire for cross-sectarian compromises in the name of peace.
Politically, they note, Syria has always been an adversary to the United States. Economically, its ties to the United States are trivial. However wrenching the conflict might be, the United States has little at stake in its outcome. The only basis on which such a claim can stand, however, is to adopt an anachronistic, rigid conception of state interest—a conception the administration knows is inadequate in an era of hyper-globalization and increasingly porous state borders.
Does the United States have an interest in preventing atrocities and supporting international mechanisms, such as Responsibility to Protect? Is it a matter of interest to the United States whether Iran consolidates its position as regional hegemon in the Arab east? Does the United States have an interest in preserving a liberal international order that constrains authoritarian regimes such as Russia and Iran, including by raising the costs of aggression, whether in Syria or the Ukraine?
As freedom of movement within the E. What, then, are some of the preliminary lessons learned from the Syrian conflict? In the short term it is not too late for the incoming president to engage the United States more assertively in efforts to move the Syrian conflict toward a negotiated transition, on terms that increase the likelihood of a durable settlement that will not force Syrians to return to the brutal dictatorship of the Assad regime, or expose them to the equally brutal predations of the Islamic State.
Recognizing that disengagement is not a cost-free option—that negative and unintended consequences will result—is essential. But this recognition does not suffice for policy formulation.
If Syrian political transition is the goal, how to achieve it? What are the key elements of strategy? Kremlin accusations notwithstanding, there is a long-standing American political consensus that violent regime change should not be an element of US strategy. Invading and occupying Syria has never been on the American agenda. American aid to Syrian rebels resisting state terror was never of a quality or quantity to drive the regime from Damascus. That aid was unilaterally terminated in Instead, since the early stages of the Syrian uprising, the preferred American route to political transition has been one of Syrian peace negotiations under United Nations UN auspices.
The Geneva Final Communique of June 30, , embodied an agreement between the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council that Syrian negotiators should populate, through mutual consent, a transitional governing body exercising full executive power in Syria while preserving governmental structures.
But the Assad regime rejected Geneva, spurned political transition, and mocked substantive peace negotiations. Regime opposition caused Russia to renege on that to which it agreed in If, therefore, the United States commits itself to Syrian political transition as the key that unlocks all other Syria-related policy goals, what are the elements of strategy that maximize the prospect of success without resorting to violent regime change?
Ultimately, sealing the victory over ISIS and maximizing leverage for peace talks is the main goal in stabilizing Syria; reinforced by denying northeastern Syria to the Assad regime and its allies. The prospect of ISIS waging a successful comeback via insurgency depends upon either a political overreach by Kurds in predominantly Arab areas, or b the return of a profoundly hated Assad regime on the shoulders of Iranian-led Shia militiamen. Stabilizing liberated areas—with heavy contributions personnel and funding from US allies and partners—and facilitating the growth of legitimate and effective governance mandates excluding the Assad regime and its allies from northeastern Syria.
Exclusion does not mean Syrian partition. Neither does it mean barring Syrian civil servants from their jobs or denying food to Syrians languishing under regime rule.
Successful stabilization—resulting in effective, legitimate local governance—will be neither easy nor quick nor cheap. Burden-sharing among allies will be essential and will depend on allied evaluation of American commitment to the task. The potential contributions and participation of the democratic Syrian opposition should be maximized. And although stabilization will be neither the exclusive province of American taxpayers nor officials, American commitment and leadership will be essential.
Successful stabilization will also require an ongoing American military presence on the ground, supported by the United States and coalition air combat power. Local ground forces would secure the Euphrates River de-confliction line, supported by coalition including American ground assets and air power. Having US forces on the ground assures two things: a ongoing operational focus on neutralizing at-large ISIS operatives; and b decisive lethality in response to any attempts to breach the Euphrates River line by the regime and its allies.
The survival strategy of the Assad regime has featured mass civilian homicide aimed at separating, through state terror, armed rebels from a popular support base. The result has been a humanitarian abomination killing hundreds of thousands of people, producing over six-million refugees, and in sending a politically destabilizing migratory wave of Syrians across Western Europe. Effectively undermining a survival strategy rooted in war crimes can protect vulnerable populations, weaken the regime, defend allies, and promote political transition.
Although the regime has a special affection for the terror-inducing properties of chemical weapons, these horrific devices account for an extremely small portion of the casualties produced by state terror. By publicly highlighting chemical weapons use as the trigger for military retaliation, the United States and its allies have inadvertently signaled to the Assad regime that other tools of mass terror—barrel bombs, field artillery, rockets, Scud missiles, and conventional aerial bombs—are permissible.
Mass homicide should, as a matter of US policy, be inadmissible regardless of the murder weapon. Communication of this policy—and the willingness of the United States to use limited military means to enforce it—to the regime through Russia is essential. State terror in Syria will continue so long as the Assad regime remains in place. The United States and its allies cannot stop it all short of invading and occupying the country: something that will not occur. Still, concentrating on preempting and punishing mass casualty events can save many lives, prevent refugee flows, and hurt the regime militarily.
Significant damage can be inflicted on regime air, artillery, rocket, and missile capabilities without placing manned aircraft in Syrian airspace.
Protecting civilians through limited military force would neutralize the most destructive aspect of mass homicide while perhaps convincing some regime supporters of the limits and downsides of state terror and its perpetrators. Russia supports and participates in mass casualty operations.
Russian combat pilots have displayed a special affinity for bombing hospitals. Notwithstanding overwhelming escalatory dominance, the United States should avoid responding militarily to Russian war crimes in Syria in favor of a diplomatic effort aimed at persuading Moscow to eliminate state terror altogether as a feature of the Syrian conflict.
First, it is essential to maximize political pressure on the regime by denying it recognition and reconstruction funding while maintaining a policy demanding full justice and accountability for crimes against humanity. The Assad regime has compiled a loathsome record of targeting civilians for mass homicide, 28 Scott Lucas. It has behaved with impunity and unaccountability. It has set a dangerous strategic precedent for the survival strategies of corruptly violent regimes around the world, one whose human consequences threaten stability on a global scale.
Reestablishing a US diplomatic presence in Damascus while this regime remains in place should be unthinkable. Washington should make clear its own position on this matter and discourage friends and allies from reopening embassies. Indeed, if legitimate local governance takes root in liberated northeastern Syria the United States should consider recognizing an alternate Syrian Arab Republic Government and working to seat that government in the UN.
No country in which government is accountable to taxpayers will be able to provide reconstruction assistance to Syria through the Assad regime. Grants, loans, trade, and investments not stolen outright in part or in full would be used by the regime for its own narrow political purposes.
Attempts to bypass the regime to restore damaged and destroyed infrastructure and facilitate refugee return, if feasible, should be supplemented by financial sanctions aimed at regime-related individuals and institutions that would seek to benefit from or dominate reconstruction assistance.
Humanitarian assistance would, ideally, flow to all Syrians in need. But the United States should work with the UN and other humanitarian aid providers to insure regime-associated individuals do not benefit financially or politically from humanitarian assistance activities.
There is no shortage of evidence—much of it from official Syrian sources—of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Assad regime. The United States should place accountability and justice front-and-center in its policy toward Syria. Bashar al-Assad and key members of his family and entourage are fugitives from justice. Keeping this fact front-and-center would be an important facet of a policy aimed at preventing broad normalization with a criminal enterprise and keeping alive the prospect of political transition.
Additionally, it is crucial to support the growth of civil society and the functioning legitimate local governance in areas such as Idlib province not held by the regime, while seeking to neutralize terrorist elements in those areas. During eight years of conflict, Syrian civilians in many parts of the country have graduated from a one-party, one-clan dictatorship to developing a vibrant civil society and experiencing self-government for the first time.
Supporting these positive trends in non-regime areas will make it more difficult for the Assad regime to restore its brutally authoritarian system.
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