Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites. Includes the barriers tariff and non-tariff that U. These measures should serve legitimate public policy goals, but the requirements can be problematic when they are overly restrictive or discriminatory and are used to inhibit trade.
In cases where they are more trade-restrictive or more burdensome than necessary, they are technical barriers to trade. For assistance with non-tariff barriers related to trade agreement non-compliance, such as standards and technical regulations-related barriers i.
Other trade agreement non-compliance areas that TANC provides assistance includes import licensing, trade facilitation, customs valuation, rules of origin, anti-corruption, government procurement, investment, and sanitary and phytosanitary non-tariff trade barriers. Seeking voluntary compliance through relevant trade agreements, diplomatic resources, and advocacy from high-level officials is the preferred option to remove trade barriers in a commercially meaningful time frame.
The United States continues to monitor the situation with these regulations for any changes that could have a further adverse impact on U. Officials lost a legal dispute they knew they were going to lose and, in the process, generated considerable negative media attention. And in hindsight, maybe it was unfortunate that the government pursued the case the way it did. Looking back, maybe it was unfortunate the government did prosecute the case.
The Auto Pact was dead anyway, the fundamentals of the industry were good, and Canada had commitments from the Japanese. In the aftermath of the WTO decision in the Auto Pact Case , Canada had two options for bringing itself into consistency with its obligations. Being consistent with one set of trade obligations, therefore, does not always mean that you need to liberalize trade.
In other words, this review of the Auto Pact Case demonstrates that decisions emanating from the WTO are implemented from within state borders. Competing domestic interests, not the international trade regime, set the parameters of public policy. In this respect, the state retains control over policy-making at the national level. The government of Canada defended this challenge at the WTO for two reasons. First, there was considerable public pressure on Canadian officials to protect the Auto Pact as it had become a potent symbol of economic prosperity.
Extensive media coverage surrounding the matter ensured that the government was under pressure to take a strong public stance against the WTO challenge, even if privately officials knew that there was little hope that the country could win its case.
Second, there were intensive lobbying efforts by the Big Three to keep the provisions of the Auto Pact for as long as possible in order to maintain their competitive advantage over foreign car manufacturers. Government officials took these concerns seriously and adhered to the wishes of auto manufacturers both in defending the action at the WTO and in implementing the decision.
Defending the case did not simply delay the inevitable but fuelled the controversy and intensified public anger at the outcome. Had the government simply conceded that changes were necessary at the early stages of the conflict, possibly even prior to the complaint being filed, it could have controlled the outcome rather than simply appear to be reacting to a legal decision being made elsewhere.
This was, in other words, a case that arguably should never have gone to the WTO. Canada should have dealt with the problem in in a manner that best protected the national interest rather than focusing solely on the interests of its stakeholders.
Would it really have been an error to provide Japanese car manufacturers such as Toyota and Honda with an incentive to increase their auto production in Canada just like that received by the North American auto manufacturers?
NOTES: 1. For a more detailed review of the parliamentary measure see Debra P. Jackson and Alan Sykes, eds. As the European Communities and the Japanese complaints were similar in nature, they were consolidated and heard by a single panel pursuant to Art.
Poloz, vice-president and chief economist, EDC, www. Vehicle assembly is maintaining its share, and vehicle parts are a leading growth sector. These characteristics are symptomatic of an industrial sector in transformation, not long-term decline. The author gratefully acknowledges the many individuals who met her to discuss the case and its implications. She also would like to thank David R. Vipond, and the Fellows at the Institute of International Economic Law at Georgetown University Law Centre, , who provided input and assistance with this project in varying capacities.
The Minister of Trade assured parliamentarians, however, that the new trade regime would not have any negative impact on Canadian automobile sales and production: Nothing in the Uruguay Round adversely affects, or indeed affects, the Canadian automobile industry, other than the reduction in tariffs on manufactured goods.
The WTO is also facing challenges relating to dispute resolution. According to a number of observers, the difficulties that are being encountered in appointing new members to the organization's Appellate Body are limiting the WTO 's ability to enforce multilateral agreements.
Within this context, this paper discusses specific challenges that are putting stress on the WTO 's multilateral trading system and identifies Canada's priorities in each of these areas. Before describing challenges relating to the WTO 's negotiation of new or updated multilateral agreements, its monitoring of members' compliance with WTO agreements and its resolution of trade-related disputes between its members, the paper outlines some challenges concerning the WTO 's governance that may be affecting the degree to which the organization can effectively fulfill its responsibilities in the three aforementioned areas.
The WTO performs its executive function through various bodies, councils and committees, 10 as well as through its Secretariat. Addressing challenges relating to the WTO 's executive function could improve the organization's governance and, in turn, its ability to negotiate new — and update existing — multilateral agreements, monitor members' compliance with these agreements, and resolve trade-related disputes that arise among its members.
This decision-making process could explain the limited extent to which the WTO 's bodies, 12 particularly its Ministerial Council MC , are able to achieve results. The WTO 's most recent MC , which was held in December , did not result in a ministerial declaration, 14 nor did it reach consensus on several substantive issues.
To improve the WTO 's decision-making process, some reform proposals have called for the creation of an executive committee. Comprising representatives of four groups of WTO members, this committee would address the lack of leadership at the WTO and would provide guidance regarding both future negotiations by — and the operation of — the organization. The WTO 's Secretariat provides technical assistance to some WTO members to facilitate their implementation of the organization's multilateral agreements, gives professional and technical support to the WTO 's various bodies, and produces global trade monitoring reports.
At present, the Secretariat's role in implementing the WTO 's multilateral agreements is limited, partly because the WTO is a member-driven organization. Moreover, the Secretariat has no decision-making powers. According to some observers, strengthening the Secretariat's role as an agenda setter in the WTO and enhancing its capacity to undertake research and collect data 24 could enhance its ability to implement the WTO 's multilateral agreements.
Canada wants to strengthen the operation and functioning of the WTO. According to Global Affairs Canada, they are. The failure to make progress in the WTO 's Doha Round of multilateral negotiations, which is sometimes referred to as the Doha Development Agenda DDA , illustrates the organization's current difficulties in concluding new multilateral agreements. The Doha Round, which was originally scheduled to end in , made no progress until the Agreement on Trade Facilitation was concluded in Despite that limited progress, the WTO 's Ministerial Declaration identified outstanding divisions among members concerning the larger Doha Round negotiations.
The WTO 's difficulty in negotiating new, or updating existing, multilateral agreements has led countries to conclude bilateral and plurilateral agreements, which the WTO calls regional trade agreements RTAs. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership CPTPP is a recent example of a plurilateral agreement that, once ratified by all partner countries, will account for an estimated The WTO 's membership comprises developed countries, developing countries and least-developed countries LDCs ; together, the latter two groups form the majority of the members.
Persistent trade-related differences among WTO members that may reflect their development status could be hindering the organization's ability to conclude new, or update existing, multilateral agreements. For example, a number of the developing countries and LDCs that are WTO members have resisted negotiating certain issues, such as investment and e-commerce, before securing improved market access for their agricultural exports to developed countries.
Furthermore, a country's development status may affect the pace at which it implements its WTO obligations. This article is part of the Trade Policy for Uncertain Times special feature. Do you have something to say about the article you just read? Be part of the Policy Options discussion, and send in your own submission. Here is a link on how to do it. You are welcome to republish this Policy Options article online and in print periodicals.
We ask that you follow these guidelines. Please attribute the author s and mention that the article was originally published by Policy Options magazine. Editing the piece is not permitted, but you may publish excerpts. Originally published on Policy Options August 3, Republish this article.
Economy Global Affairs. Four things Canada can do Whatever the US hesitations about multilateralism are at the moment, it is essential to keep the Americans in the system and keep the lights on at the WTO. More like this Trade. Related stories.
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